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Disclosing Mathematics
By Tre Schumacher
schumachert1@student.lasalle.edu

Abstract
According to Heidegger, phenomenology is critical of purely metaphysical thinking
insofar as the history of Western metaphysics has discounted the significance of physis. For
Heidegger, Western metaphysics has lost its way by ‘forgetting’ being, and likewise so has logic.
This paper will argue that if mathematics aims to investigate the truth of being, then ontology has
been divorced from the investigation of mathematical truth in a similar fashion that ontology has
been divorced from logic and the history of Western metaphysics for Heidegger.
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Part I: Heidegger and logic
I.

The meaning of physis

F. E. Peters describes physis as the subject matter of logos (Peters, 1967, 158). Plato1 and
Aristotle2 call the early philosophers physikoi, meaning those who are concerned with physis.
Physis is sometimes translated as ‘nature’.3 F. E. Peters describes Heraclitus’4 use of physis as “a
kind of internal organizational principle, the structure of things” (Peters, 1967, 158).5 Apart
from Heraclitus, it has been used as growth, movement, increase, or ‘the physical stuff in the
world’. In Elucidations of Holderlin's Poetry, Heidegger says physis does not merely mean
growth or an increase, but rather to emerge or disclose6 (Seidel, 1964, 34).7 Even when physis
does refer to growth8 in early Western ontology, it does not only refer to evolution or mere

1

Phaedo 96a.
Metaphysics 1005a.
3
Heidegger believes that physis has lost its meaning in translation. Physis was translated into Latin as
natura. Heidegger describes the meaning of natura as ‘to be born’ or ‘birth’. In An Introduction to
Metaphysics Heidegger writes “but with this Latin translation the original meaning of the Greek word
physis is thrust aside, the actual philosophical force of the Greek word is destroyed” (Heidegger, 1959,
13).
4
I mention Heraclitus because his notion of logos and physis is important in the development of the
treatment of the two terms for Heidegger.
5
Peters cites Heraclitus’ fragment number 123.
6
For Heidegger, the truth (and the truth of being) is hidden. It is concealed but can be disclosed or
revealed. In his lectures from 1925-1926, he lists 5 different meanings of truth, all of which he says share
the same “structure of just-as or as-so” (Heidegger, 2010, 8).
7
Physis is, for Heidegger’s purpose and according to Heidegger’s interpretation, an uncovering (of the
truth of being). He writes “physis is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the
hidden is first made to stand” (Heidegger, 1959, 14-15).
8
The relationship between growth and disclosure is this: when beings grow, some of their potentialities
are actualized. Beings are permanently in flux, in a state of becoming, and they become what they had
the potential to become. When a being is growing, its former potentialities are disclosing. In his lecture
series titled An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes “physis is the process of a-rising, of
emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand” (Heidegger, 1959, 14-15). He also
writes “the Greeks did not learn what physis is through natural phenomena, but the other way around”
(Heidegger, 1959, 14). He does not explicitly back this claim with concrete historical evidence, though.
Although, this claim could make sense (solely) etymologically if physis is derived from the PIE (Proto-Indo
European) root *bheuɘ- — meaning ‘to be’, ‘to grow’. This would mean that greek phusika ( meaning
‘physics’ and which is derived from physis and as such) traces back to the PIE root *bheuɘ- (Houghton,
1997, 1031 and 1588). So, Heidegger’s claim arguably receives merit from etymology, if natural
phenomena (phusika) comes from a root meaning ‘to be’, ‘to grow’.
2
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becoming, but rather to ‘coming out’ or ‘coming into the light’, that is: unconcealment9 (Seidel,
1964, 34).10 Un-concealment is to dis-cover what is the case, what is true. When physis emerges
(from hiding), it “stands in unconcealment, alētheia” (Heidegger, 1959, 102).11

II.

The meaning of logos

The Greek logos has been used in different ways and its usages have changed throughout
history. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes that the root word of logos is
legein ( Heidegger, 1959, 124).12 Legein r efers to collecting, gathering, or bringing together
(Heidegger, 1959, 124).13 It can also refer to counting (Kaczyńska). Both the collecting and the
togetherness (i.e., the stuff that has been collected together) is one of the descriptions of logos.14
Legein, in its historical linguistic development, came to mean ‘to speak’ (Heidegger, 1959, 128).

9

Unconcealment or disclosure is the notion (or at least a notion) of truth for Heidegger and the ancient
Greeks. Truth is known when being is being unconcealed and is coming into the open to be seen. In
Being and Time, Heidegger writes “Being-true (truth) means to-be-discovering” (Heidegger, 1996, 201). It
is not the case that beings fully come out of hiding; rather, when a being’s being is unconcealing, it is also
concealing. Heidegger writes ‘the “being-true” of logos as alētheuein [truthing or the process of the
revealing of truth] means: to take beings that are being talked about i n legein as apophainesthai
[appearing or bringing to light] out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed
(alēthes); to discover them’ (Heidegger, 1996, 29).
10
Heidegger writes physis “denotes self-blossoming emergence… ,opening up, unfolding, that which
manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves and endures in it” (Heidegger 1959, 14).
11
For the purpose of this paper, physis will be used as in emergence or growth.
12
In PIE, *leg- means ‘to gather’ or ‘to collect’. Although, the philologist Elwira Kaczyńska argues that in
Italic, Greek and Old Indic, *leg- was originally *sleg-. She says the *s- could have been an s-mobile —
meaning that *s- appears in front of the root *leg (as *sleg-) sometimes but not all the time. Kaczyńska
says the original cluster *sl- was simplified to Latin l- and Greek λ- (Kaczyńska, 2016, 154). Kaczyńska
argues the Indo-European *sleg- is derived from the PIE root *les- — meaning ‘to collect’ or ‘to gather’.
13
Some PIE words with the root *leg- — as in the German lesen and the Latin legō — also refer to ‘read’
(as in reading a book and gathering information) (Kaczyńska, 2016 154). The Latin legō also refers to
law, rule, or regulation or resolution (as in a collection of legal rules or principles) (Kaczyńska, 2016 153).
The German lesen and the Albanian mbledh also refer to agriculture: harvesting (gathering crops), picking
(collecting) grapes to make wine, cleaning up crops (Kaczyńska, 2016 153 and Heidegger 1959, 124).
Albanian mbledh can mean “collect/gather one’s wits” or “add together” or “add up” (Stefanllari, 2000, 76
and 2).
14
In An Introduction to Metaphysics he writes ‘“in Physics, θ I, 252 a 13, Aristotle says: taxis de pasa
logos, “all order has a character of bringing together”’ (Heidegger, 1959, 125).
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This was a usage of legein by Heraclitus’ time; thus, Heraclitus writes of ‘listening to the logos’
(fragments 1 and 50, for example) (Robinson, 1987) (Heidegger, 1959, 128). Heidegger
interprets Heraclitus’ usage of logos as meaning both togetherness (collectedness) and speech:
logos speaks15 and it speaks of being (Heidegger, 1959, 128). Logos has the quality of
togetherness; the gathering of being is logos. Being is gathered in logos.
Pre-Socratic philosophers had used logos differently than later philosophers. Richard
Kearney describes logos in ancient Greek philosophy when he writes (Kearney, 1994, 41-42):
By logos the pre-Socratics understood not some logical correlation between objects, but a
hidden ontological attunement (harmonia) of the Word of human thinking (logos as
psyche) and the Word of Being (logos as eon). Heraclitus could affirm accordingly that
logos remained irreducible to a purely anthropocentric framework: “If you have heard not
me but the logos, then it is wise to say — all is one”. Post-Socratic metaphysics, by
contrast, reduced the logos to logic and made of thinking a matter of correct judgment —
a matter of adjudicating Being reductively in terms of the categories of technical
thinking.
For Heraclitus, logos is an inherent substrate of our world. F. E. Peters writes that for Heraclitus,
“logos is an underlying organizational principle of the universe” (Peters, 1967, 111). According
to Heidegger’s interpretation of the pre-Socratic notion of physis, physis is the revealing of being
which gets expressed through logos. Logos describes physis.16 In the description of physis,
Speech here does not refer merely to verbal talking. Heidegger interprets this speech as something
that can be understood by a person if they are listening; by listening, Heidegger does not refer (only) to
physiological listening, but rather he means listening to what logos (and physis, as Heidegger interprets
the pre-Socratics usage of it) is saying: listening to the logos is being attuned to being and being with
being.
16
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger writes “φύσιν [physis] [is], the prevailing of
what prevails; λόγος [logos] [is], the word, that which takes this prevailing from concealment”
15
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physis can be ‘heard’17 in the logos.18 For the pre-Socratics, physis and logos were intimately
related. Starting with interpretations of Plato, according to Heidegger, physis and logos have
become divorced for much of the history of Western metaphysics.
Plato’s use of the term logos has been interpreted in a variety of ways. One way Plato
uses logos is in contrast to mythos (myth), whereas logos is referring to the true account. In the
Phaedo, Plato uses logos to refer to account, to give an account, or to explain what is the case.19
In Theaetetus, Plato uses logos as opinion (Doxa) partnered with account. 20 Later in Theaetetus,
Socrates describes logos as a thing’s distinguishing characteristic(s).21
Aristotle has also been interpreted as using logos in a variety of ways. At times as
reason, rationality, or ‘right reason’ (especially regarding ethics). Other times logos h as been
used synonymously with horos (definition or form) (Peters, 1967, 111). In parts of Metaphysics,
he uses logos as mathematical proportion ( 991b) (Peters, 1968, 111).
Stoic linguistic theory distinguished between interior logos and exterior logos, where the
former is thought and the latter is speech (Peters, 1967, 112).

(Heidegger,1995, 28). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger identifies physis with logos as
‘gathering’ when he writes “physis = logos anthrōpon echon [human being has logos] : being,
overpowering appearing [physis] , necessitates the gathering [logos] which pervades and grounds
being-human” (Heidegger, 175, 1959).
17
For Heraclitus, logos is heard by listening to the world in one’s lived experience. In An Introduction to
Metaphysics, Heidegger writes “true hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means: to follow
the logos and what it is, namely the collectedness of the essent itself” (Heidegger, 1959, 129).
18
Physis is always revealing itself, however logos is not always heard, according to Heraclitus. Physis is
only disclosed if logos is heard (Robsinson, 1987, fragments 1 and 2).
19
‘“And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been
talking?”’ (Phaedo 76b).
20
Theaet says “He [by he, Theaet refers to ‘someone’, and this perhaps implies that Theaet has forgotten
who the man was who told him this] said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but
that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge” (Theaetetus, 201 c-d).
21
“Knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all
others” (Theaetetus, 208-c).
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With the pre-Socratics, logos was the phenomenon that describes physis and describes
truth. With later (after Socrates) thought, logos was treated as the ‘correct statement’;22 logos for
later philosophers is not grounded in truth or ontology; it is instead ontical23 (Seidel, 1964, 30
and Kearney, 1994, 42).24

III.

Heidegger's project: overcoming metaphysics

Heidegger criticized the history of western metaphysics25 for forgetting the question of
being.2627 Western metaphysics is being accused of treating existence ontically as opposed to
ontologically: Western metaphysics investigated beings but not Being.28 Beings are what things

Heidegger writes “initially the logos as gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in
unconcealment and serving it. Now, logos as statement becomes the abode of truth in the sense of
correctness. And this process culminates in Aristotle’s proposition to the effect that logos as statement is
that which can be true or false” (Heidegger, 1959,186).
23
Ontic refers to beings or entities; ontology refers to Being. The positive sciences are ontical in that they
observe the surface of things. An example of an ontical discipline would be experimental psychology —
which uses the scientific method to reach conclusions on the human psyche. Research in experimental
psychology is superficial in that it examines the end result of what people do, without taking into account
ontological factors (such as facticity, for example). Furthermore, experimental psychology assumes that
(the ‘psyche’ is a thing that exists, and) the results of the human behavior that seem to appear from
experiments are directly caused by or related to the psyche. A discipline contrasted to the positive
sciences would be phenomenology, which is doing ontology in that it investigates the Being of human
beings and not just how human behavior appears on the surface from an outside observer. See the next
section for more on the distinction between ontic and ontology.
24
This claim — the claim that logos in later philosophy is not grounded in truth or ontology — is made by
Seidel and Kearney.
25
Seidel writes that in Heidegger’s later work, ‘metaphysics’ has a negative connotation. Seidel writes
that in Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the “destruction of the history of ontology” (Seidel cites Sein
und Zeit pp. 19 ff.); in his later terminology, however, Heidegger would have used the word metaphysics
instead of ontology. In his later terminology, Heidegger used ‘metaphysics’ to refer to the philosophy that
forgot being, opposed to ‘ontology’ — which is being itself (Seidel, 1964, 30 in footnote 16).
26
‘The question of the meaning of being was not only unresolved, not only adequately formulated, but in
spite of all interest in “metaphysics” has even been forgotten’ (Heidegger, 1996, 19).
27
For Heidegger, the authentic truth of being can be found in the pre-Socratics — where truth was
disclosed but then soon concealed. The authentic truth of being can also be found, for Heidegger, via a
phenomenological investigation of human being — something which Heidegger attempts throughout his
career (most famously in Being and Time).
28
Being is sometimes written with a capital ‘B’ and beings with a lowercase ‘b’.
22
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are; Being is how a thing (beings) exists. Ontic (beings) refers to mere entities; ontology (Being)
is the meaning of beings.29

a. Heidegger on logos and logic
In his lectures published under the title Logic: The question of truth and The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger stresses the need for logic to become
philosophical again (Heidegger, 2010 and Heidegger, 1992).30 He repudiates privileging formal
logic as a method of investigating the truth of being, arguing that it contains no philosophy. All
school teachers do, “year after year, is parrot the same old stock of unchanging, shopworn
propositions, formulas, rules, and definitions” which students merely memorize (Heideger, 2010,
10). There is no philosophizing or “serious questioning and investigation” going on (Heidegger,
2010, 10). As such, formal logic eradicates ontological considerations; or, logic has ‘forgotten’
the question of being.
Formal logic is thought of as a way to investigate truth and furthermore, the laws of a
formal logic themselves are set in stone and treated as true. Formally logical laws are timeless,31
as opposed to being grounded in time;32 instead of letting truth reveal itself, the apparatus that is
The difference between Being and beings is referred to as the ontological difference b
 y Heidegger. As
Michael Wheeler explains it, the ontological difference is the difference “between the ontical and the
ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the
meaning of Being” (Wheeler).
30
‘“Scholastic logic” is not philosophy’ (Heidegger, 2010, 10). “So this is the challenge: logic should
change; logic should become philosophical!” (Heidegger, 1992, 5).
31
Time grounds being, for Heidegger; as such, if logic is timeless, it cannot investigate being. He writes
“because being is in each case comprehensible only in regard to time, the answer to the question of being
cannot lie in an isolated and blind proposition. The answer [to the question of being] is not grasped by
repeating what is stated propositionally” (Heidegger, 1996, 17).
32
To clarify, human existence is temporal for Heidegger not because existence is in temporality, but
rather because temporality is in the very ground of existence. Care, projection, happening and the other
characteristics which constitute Dasein’s being are necessarily grounded in temporality. In Being and
Time, Heidegger writes “confirmation is to be found for temporality in all the essential structures of the
fundamental constitution of Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1996, 305). Or, as George Seidel describes this idea:
29
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formal logic manufactures an unambiguous, timeless ‘truth’. In Being and Time, Heidegger,
speaking on formal “systems of relations,'' says “such formalizations level down the phenomena
to the extent that the true phenomenal content gets lost” (Heidegger, 1996, 82). Heidegger’s
critique of formal logic is essentially the same as his critique of the history of Western
metaphysics: ontology has been forgotten.
Heidegger writes that “the subject matter of logic is speech”33 and “logic investigates
speaking” (Heidegger, 2010, 6). For Heidegger, logic is the science of truth and truth is revealed
by speech or in-speaking. For Heidegger, logic and language are connected (as Heidegger
thought it was for the ancient Greeks).34 He writes “in such acts of revealing, whatever one is
speaking about shows up, becomes perceivable, and, as something perceived, gets defined in and
by the discussion about it” and “language, speaking, thinking: they coincide as the human way of
being” (Heidegger, 2010, 6). Speaking is fundamental to being human. Speech is how beings
are uncovered and when they are, their truth is revealed (see footnote 6) (Heidegger, 2010, 6).

IV.

Problems with a logic

Examples of a logic35 are not limited to a formal logic; Hegelian logic, Mill’s method of
induction, and Popper’s falsification are also examples of a logic. In its attempt to formalize

Dasein “does not live in time; rather, he lives timely” (Seidel, 1964, 21 in footnote 37). Non-human things
have no history for they only have temporality in relation to Dasein’s temporality; non-human things
themselves do not have their own temporality. Temporality (and thus history) of non-human things are
only possible through and because of Dasein’s t emporality.
33
In this quote and in this paragraph, ‘logic’ does not refer to formal logic; this paragraph is devoted to
Heidegger’s normative description of ‘logic’.
34
He writes “among the Greeks logic developed in connection with grammar understood as the study of
language” (Heidegger, 2010, 5). ‘In fact,... [logic and language] were so indistinct that the Greeks lacked
a word for what we call “language”’ (Heidegger, 2010, 5).
35
By the term ‘a logic’, I refer to any system that has a defined set of laws that are meant to be universally
applied to the world to analyze truth.
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ontology (even if it be a regional ontology; Popper’s falsification, for example, deals with the
regional ontology called ‘science’) via reducing ontology to a system of rules, laws or formulas,
which are tools for evaluating truth, a logic does not deal with ontology at all; rather, it is tasked
with beings and their ontical relation to each other. A logic c ould never be ‘correct’ or ‘true’
because any attempt to formalize being would necessarily exclude some of being. A logic is a
determinate being3637 a nd as such it conceals b eings as opposed to revealing the truth.
Heidegger’s interpretation of the pre-Socratic use of physis/logos stands in contrast to a
logic. T
 his interpretation of physis/logos is not determined and thus is not closed-off from all of
what it negates; this interpretation of physis/ logos encompasses all of being.

a. Problems with a logic: the Ravens paradox
The Ravens paradox (also known as the Raven’s problem or Hempel’s paradox) was put
forth by Carl Hempel and has been debated by different thinkers from different views (namely
I.J. Good and Nelson Goodman). It is said in a formal logic that if a hypothesis is true, then its
logical equivalence must also be true.38 Hence, in his article Studies in the Logic of
Hegel’s logic starts with his concept of being or pure being. When all content and properties are
abstracted from the world or no properties are ascribed to the world, what is left is everything, yet nothing;
this idea of a property-less world is called pure being for Hegel. Hegel says that pure being i s identical
with nothing or pure nothing. In the Science of Logic he says that pure being “would not be held fast in its
purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be
distinguished from an other” (Hegel, 1996, 82). Determinate being, for Hegel, then, is a being which does
have qualities. A determinate being may be thought of as a thing or a distinct thing with properties, as
opposed to nothingness or everything. Part of a determinate being for Hegel is that a determinate being
has a negation. Another way of thinking about it is that determinate being is (a) ‘something’ and not (a)
‘something else’. A plant (which is a determinate being, ) is not a tree, a shirt, a human or anything else
(these ‘anything else’ are in themselves determinate beings with their own qualities and negations). A
determinate being i s all that which it is not, or as Hegel and his followers sometimes put it: a determinate
being is the negation of its negation.
37
Determinate in Hegel is the translation of the German word Dasein. Although, Hegel uses Dasein
differently from Heidegger.
38
While describing the Ravens paradox, Peter Godfrey-Smith describes the idea of logical equivalence:
“any evidence that confirms a hypothesis H also confirms any hypothesis that is logically equivalent to H.
36
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Confirmation, Hempel writes that the statement “all ravens are black” must be logically
equivalent to the statement “whatever is not black is not a raven” (Hempel, 1965, 12). He writes
the two statements in first-order logic:39
S₁: ‘(x)[Raven(x) ⊃ Black(x)]’;
S₂: ‘(x)[~Black(x) ⊃ ~ Raven(x)]’
If this is true, observing a white shoe — which is not black and not a raven — would make it true
that all ravens are black. So, if a white shoe is observed, this would suggest that all ravens are
black.
The equivalence of these two hypotheses is figured by a logical formula, but it does not
make empirical sense.40 The logical reasoning put forward by Hempel in his paradox is an
example of formal logic being ontical, abstract and ultimately incapable of finding truth. In
formal language, the Ravens paradox is not a paradox and it is only through rationality and
empirical observation that disproves this logical ‘truth’. By use of logical rules only, it is
regarded as ‘true’ that if someone observes a white shoe, then all Ravens are black.

Part II: Mathematics
V.

Abstraction-and-application

In the hard and social sciences, ontic philosophies, formal logic and mathematics, there is
a theme of abstraction-and-application: beings are observed, principles about beings are
abstracted f rom them, and these principles are applied back to those beings to investigate truth.

… if H is logically equivalent to H*, then it is impossible for H
  to be true but H* false, or vice versa”
(Godfrey-Smith, 2003, 46-47).
39
The following is Hempel’s exact language, including the single quotes and semicolon.
40
Non-black ravens have been observed.
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Aristotle arrived at his findings in his natural philosophy through everyday experience.
Aristotle’s proposition that heavier objects fall faster than quicker objects was widely accepted
for centuries until Galileo’s law of falling bodies. Aristotle observed the world and formed,
abstracted, laws of it. Once the laws were established, they were applied b ack to the world.
Galileo did the same: came to a conclusion about falling bodies and wrote it down as a ‘law’ to
then be applied to future falling bodies.41
In formal logic, abstraction-and-application take place when ‘laws’ of existing (ontic)
things are created and then applied back to the subject matter that formal logic investigates. The
idea of classical logic is to investigate truth via its laws that are permanently defined before any
investigation takes place. Classical logic assumes its laws are true absolutely.
Abstraction-and-application can investigate ontic truth, but not ontological truth. Classical logic
42

assumes the law of the excluded middle, that any proposition is either true or its negation is

true. This law is not clearly true, though. There are logics that reject the law of the excluded
middle (intuitionistic logic,43 for example). There are certainly instances where a proposition is
not either true or false. There can be instances where a proposition can be: a) known to be true
or false but it can be unable to know which, b) not able to be known whether or not it is true or
false, c) partially true and partially false, d) relative to something, e) any combination of any of
these.

41

The significance of Aristotle and Galileo here is only to give an example of a hard science (physics in
this case) as a historical series of proposed laws formulated via abstraction-and-application.
42
‘Classical logic’ is one of the more prominent logics. One of the axioms of classical logic is the law of
the excluded middle (Lovas).
43
‘Intuitionistic logic’ is a non-classical logic developed by L. E. J. Brouwer in 1907 and 1908. It rejects
the law of the excluded middle (Moschovakis).
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Phenomenology aims to get away from a process like abstraction-and-application as this
method (the method of abstraction-and-application) produces theories that are not ontological,
but rather ontical. In the first half of Being and Time’s introduction, Heidegger explicates how
scientific knowledge develops. He writes “the totality of beings can, with respect to its various
domains, become the field where particular areas of knowledge are exposed and delimited. These
areas—for example, history, nature, space, life, human being, language, and so on—can in their
turn become thematized as objects of scientific investigation” (Heidegger, 1996, 7). In other
words, scientific fields of investigation may be isolated, abstracted, from being (“Being,” Sein,
for Heidegger).

VI.

Returning mathematics to ontology

Mathematics is another subject that contains the process of abstraction-and-application.
An aspect of being is that it contains mathematics;44 physis is mathematical because mathematics
is grounded in physis.45 Mathematics’ manifestation is always present, always operative.
Mathematics — manifesting as phenomena joining together, moving apart, multiplying, being
grouped together, being counted, etc. — can always be experienced in physis. Consider the
mathematical implications of Plato’s Parmenides. Although Plato is writing before the advent of
set theory, Socrates is doing naïve set theory in Plato’s Parmenides when he speaks of forms.
Responding to Zeno at 129 d, Socrates argues there are “forms, themselves by themselves, of the
things I was talking about a moment ago—for example, likeness and unlikeness, multitude and
oneness, rest and motion.” Then, Parmenides questions Socrates about the “form, itself by itself,
In Being and Time, Heidegger writes “what mathematics makes accessible in beings constitute their
being” (Heidegger, 1996, 89).
45
To clarify here, physis means emergence or growth as it appears to me.
44
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of just, and beautiful, and good… [and] human being, or fire, or water… [and] hair and mud and
dirt” and things that are similar to the things mentioned (Plato 130 b-c). The theory of forms can
have at least two set-theoretic interpretations: a) each thing (good, water, hair, etc.) listed as a
unit set46 or b) each thing listed as a set with all of the phenomena exemplifying the thing being a
member of the set (for example, a beautiful person would be a member of the set of beauty, an
instance of justice would be a member of the set of justice, and my hair would be a member of
the set of hair). Sets cannot ontologically explicate forms, though; sets can only ontically
describe forms. Plato’s forms (of justice, beauty, hair, etc.) exhibited as sets is only possible
through Being.4748 Fundamental ontology founds mathematics. Mathematics manifests in physis
and is only made distinct from physis when it is abstracted a nd treated as an isolated area of
phenomenon or study.49
From the experience of mathematics-in-physis, self evident axioms are revealed and
realized (or ‘heard’) in the logos. Once mathematics is revealed as a property of being,
mathematics can be abstracted into mathematics proper.50 Once abstracted, mathematics is
treated not a s a property of being among all other properties of being, but rather a determinate
being that is negated from all that it is not. Mathematics, which has been abstracted from being,
can now be applied back into being. Once principles of mathematics proper are accepted as true,

46

A ‘unit set’, also known as a ‘singleton’, is a set with only one member.
The set of the form of justice, beauty and hair originates with the lived experience of these forms. For
example: a) having justice served to you or engaging in political activity to struggle for justice; b)
appreciating the beauty of an artwork or woman; c) having hair, taking care of (cutting, styling, washing,
etc.) it and sharing having hair with other beings that have it; etc. and all that these things ontologically
entail.
48
The argument that Being founds mathematics — in this example, being founding Plato’s forms as sets
— refutes idealism, realism, and other philosophical schools.
49
This isolated area of phenomenon or study is ‘mathematics propper’ (see footnote 50).
50
‘Mathematics proper’ does not refer to mathematics-in-physis, but rather to what mathematicians study.
Mathematics proper is the field of mathematics as it is studied at schools or research centers.
47
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they can then be applied to nearly any, if not all phenomena through numbers (quantity),
measurement (of space or time), sets, addition and subtraction, multiplication and division, and
so on.

VII. The process of the elevation of mathematics
Once mathematics proper is abstracted, it becomes a determinate being and is a distinct
thing from physis. As a determinate being which is now an abstract entity, mathematical
investigation can now be manipulated by idealities and restricted by formal reasoning.
Investigation of mathematics proper has two components (among other components): one is
artistic and idealistic; the other is formal (as in strict rules and formal language). Both contribute
to the elevation51 of mathematics from its grounding i n physis; that is,
1. the aspect of mathematics proper that is artistic and idealistic (perfect lines and shapes,
for example) does not portray mathematics-in-physis, but rather an idealistic
representation of mathematics-in-physis. And
2. the formal aspect (formal-axioms52 or formal proof techniques, for example) of
mathematics proper may misguide the investigation of the truth of mathematics-in-physis.
In Being and Time’s introduction, Heidegger says all sciences are founded and depend on basic
concepts or laws; upon them, structures and superstructures are built. A system of axioms,
however, does not facilitate the disclosing of the truth of being; rather, axioms can delimit
investigation and cover truth. Heidegger writes:

Elevation meaning that mathematics loses its grounding a
 nd becomes a theoretical study with no
ontological grounding.
52
By formal-axioms, I refer to the formalized and accepted axioms of mathematics that mathematicians
use. ZFC or the Peano axioms would be examples of formal-axioms.
51
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The elaboration of the area in its fundamental structures is in a way already accomplished
by prescientific experience and interpretation of the domain of being to which the area of
knowledge is itself confined. The resulting “fundamental concepts” comprise the
guidelines for the first concrete disclosure of the area (Heidegger, 1996, 7).
When considering (the scientific area that is) mathematics, this means formal-axioms are
‘pre-scientifically experienced’. Heidegger later writes of ‘foundations’ of a given science,
writing that the science’s ability to progress depends on its basic and fundamental concepts, its
foundation, its axioms.53 Writing on specific sciences, Heidegger writes that (at the time of
Being and Time)
theology is slowly beginning to understand again Luther’s insight that its system of
dogma rests on a “foundation” that does not stem from a questioning in which faith is
primarily and whose conceptual apparatus is not only insufficient for the range of
problems in theology but rather covers them up and distorts them (Heidegger, 1996, 8).
In other words, in aiming at investigating mathematical truth, axioms do not reveal truth, but
(due to axioms’ inability to completely reveal) can d istort and conceal truth. Later, Heidegger
writes “the question of being… aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only of the
sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type… [but] it aims… at the condition of
the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them” (Heidegger,
1996, 9). That is, fundamental ontology founds science; science is only possible because of
Being. If true, fundamental ontology founds mathematics.

“A science’s level of development is determined by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its
basic concepts. In these immanent crises of the sciences the relation of positive questioning to the matter
in question becomes unstable” (Heidegger, 1996, 8).
53

Schumacher 16

With the elevation of the truth of mathematics proper due to artistic/idealistic and
formalistic distortion, mathematics is no longer in physis; mathematics is no longer in its ground
but rather it is elevated from its ground. When mathematics is elevated, it is now a theoretical
science and its investigation is subject to idealities and limited to formal rules.

a. Art and ideal
The search for a mathematical proof consists of creativity as much as it consists of strict
rule-following. There are different methods of proof and writing a proof consists of trial and
error and juggling with the different logical possibilities. At times, mathematicians may even
create new definitions for mathematics as they go along (see the section below on ‘Mathematical
proofs’ where Lakatos says this).
Aesthetic appeal has perhaps acted as a bias in the history of mathematical research.
Zeno’s space and time paradoxes indicated anomalies in Ancient Greek geometry, but Greek
geometers looked past the paradoxes. They dismissed them as unsound as they searched for a
more aesthetic and perfect ‘truth’ (Wilder, 1968, 8). Galileo discovered findings in set theory
(Cantor later ‘discovered’ them, too) that he thought “ruined all hope of describing different
sizes of infinite sets” (Crossley, 1972, 3). He thought that these findings must be meaningless.
These instances show that in some cases, mathematical investigation can be affected by an
aesthetic bias where mathematicians over-privilege beauty to truth.
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b. Problems with formal-axioms
If the aim of the study of mathematics is to investigate the truth of mathematics proper,
formal-axioms may distort truth in mathematics, for:
1. formal-axioms may not be identical with the true axioms of mathematics-in-physis;54
2. the likely limitations of formal-axioms will act as a paradigm for mathematicians to work
in, making their research closed-off from intuition and thus promoting limited or biased
research (that is, limited by or biased in favor of the set of axioms the mathematician is
working with, familiar with, or tends to have a bias toward);
3. once formal-axioms are put forth and used in mathematical investigation, if the
formal-axioms are used strictly, then mathematics becomes less so the study of shape,
quantity, etc. in t he lived experience, and more so like a game consisting of attempts to
prove that given conjectures fit in l ike a puzzle piece to the larger system/game. If two
different groups of people are both playing with a standard deck of cards, but playing two
different games, the games will, of course, be different. Analogously, two
mathematicians using two different sets of formal-axioms can arrive at different
mathematical ‘truths’.
It is in the ways listed in this section that the use of formal language and rules contribute to the
elevation of mathematics.

A logic cannot encompass all of physis/logos. Likewise, formal-axioms may not encompass the truth of
mathematics-in-physis.
54
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c. Mathematical proofs
Mathematical proofs have similar problems that formal-axioms have. According to Paul
Ernest, “mathematical propositions are fallible and corrigible and... published proofs are
unreliable as they are very commonly flawed” (Howell and Bradley, 2010, 3 1). If a
mathematical proof is sound, the conjecture that it proves still may be unprovable under a
different proof method. In 1938 Godel proved two axioms: the Axiom of Choice and the
Continuum hypothesis. In 1963 Cohen showed that the negation of these two axioms is
unprovable (Crossley, 1972, 9-10). In Proofs and Refutations, Imre Lakatos argues that
mathematics develops through dialogue. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy dedicated
to Lakatos, Alan Musgrave and Charles Pigden write ‘attempts to rescue… [a] conjecture from
refutation yield(s) “proof-generated definitions”... and “concept stretching”’ (Pigden and
Musgrave, 2016). In other words, in an attempt to prove a conjecture correct, or rather to save a
conjecture from a refutation, mathematicians will invent new definitions to make the conjecture
conform to a method of proving it (a method of proving it that did not previously exist before the
mathematician invented new definitions).

VIII. Conclusion: mathematical truth is concealed as mathematics is elevated from
its grounding in physis
In Heidegger’s view, much of the history of Western metaphysics has lost its way
because it has forgotten being: ontology has been left out of investigation. Ontology is left out of
investigation of other fields of study too, such as logic and the positive sciences. I have argued
that a logic can never be adequate for evaluating the truth of being as it cannot encompass all of
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being or the pre-Socratic notion of physis/logos. A logic is instead an abstract e ntity that is
distinct and apart from being. Likewise, mathematics proper is an abstract entity: mathematics
is grounded in physis; once mathematics is abstracted from physis, however, it becomes an
isolated subject in-itself (opposed to being in physis) to study; mathematics loses touch with
being — with its grounding in physis. Mathematics is elevated from its ground when:
1. it becomes subject to artistic and idealistic manipulation (for example, lines are found
in-physis, but an infinite and perfectly straight line, however, is the invention of the
geometer), and
2. formalism (formal language and rules) restricts the investigation of truth in mathematics.
As the truth of mathematics is revealed in physis, it is then concealed when mathematics
is elevated from physis/logos — in which it is grounded.55 The more so formal-axioms and
methods of proofs get out-of-touch-with-being56 by relying on ontical reasoning, the more so
mathematical truth gets elevated from ground a nd thus concealed. This criticism of mathematics
follows Heidegger’s critique of logic and the history of Western metaphysics: ontology has
become divorced from questioning and ontic systems have filled its (ontology’s) place.

Mathematics is a) revealed in physis, b) abstracted from physis, c) elevated f rom its ground (which is
physis) . When mathematics is elevated, it is concealed.
56
Formal-axioms and proof methods necessarily are closed-off as they are determinate beings (opposed
to being in physis/ logos).
55
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Appendix: Clarity to account for possible criticisms from idealism
This paper may be refuted by an idealist philosophy of mathematics, which may say that
mathematical knowledge is innate and not known through experiencing mathematical
phenomena in the world. An idealist philosophy may question how we can conceptualize an
absurdly large number or a polygon with millions of sides, since they are not experienced in the
world. In addition, idealism may argue that mathematics is true regardless of our senses,57 which
(senses) are perhaps an unreliable measure of reality, anyway. However, my paper does not
claim to experience mathematical phenomenon in the form of absurdly large numbers and the
like; my paper claims mathematical phenomenon is a part of the lived experience58 and that
axioms (but not the rest of mathematics) are apprehended and deduced from what seem to be the
self-evident truths of phenomenon that fall under the domain of being called mathematics.

57

In his first meditation, Descartes says that regardless of what our senses tell us, the truth of
mathematics is the same. “For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three make five, and a square
does not have more than four sides. It does not seem possible that such obvious truths should be subject
to the suspicion of being false” (Descartes, 1993, 15).
58
That mathematics is part of the lived experience cannot be doubted. For if so, beings or phenomena
that contain any sort of mathematical property (number, sets, subtraction, addition, shape, space, etc.)
could not exist. If this was the case, no being could exist.
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